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Abstract
As part of a Symposium on the book The Economic Foundations of
International Law, this Article briefly compares and contrasts two distinct analytical
approaches to international law—doctrinal versus economic—in the context of Egypt’s and
Ethiopia’s dispute over the right to exploit the Nile River’s water resources. The Article argues
that the traditional doctrinal approach, one based solely on an examination of international
water law, treaties, and customary international law is unlikely to result in a legal conclusion
that either state is likely to respect because such an approach fails to consider the incentives,
material capabilities, and national interests of Egypt and Ethiopia. However, the Article
argues that an economics approach focusing on state preferences and incentives for compliance
with international law in a world without a central enforcement mechanism will better
illuminate the obstacles that Egypt and Ethiopia face and the likelihood of legal resolution of
the conflict. After examining the interests and political constraints on both states, the Article
concludes with a simple application of transaction costs economics, focusing on property rights
and liability rules, to understand how Egypt and Ethiopia might respond to different legal
arrangements designed to resolve the conflict.
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I. I N T R O D U C T I O N
Ranging from traditional legal doctrinal analysis to social science research
frameworks common to political science and economics, the methodological
tools available to scholars, commentators, and students of international law have
dramatically expanded. Research questions about the efficacy of international
law, the operation of international institutions, the preferences of states, and the
motivations for state behavior—questions often foreclosed by a narrow focus
on international law doctrine—are now being increasingly asked and answered.
The language of international law is not only one of treaties and custom, but also
of incentives and rational self-interest.
In The Economic Foundations of International Law, Eric Posner and Alan Sykes
contribute to the evolving study of international law by providing a conceptual
framework to theorize and predict how international law will operate in the
future.1 Beginning with the assumption that states are rational, self-interested
actors, pursuing their policy preferences in an international system without a
central enforcement mechanism, Posner and Sykes demonstrate the utility of an
economic approach in various substantive areas of international law. They
describe the conditions under which international cooperation is possible and
explain the roles of reputation, bribes, sanctions, and mutual defection in the
enforcement of international law. For them, the economics approach is a fruitful
alternative to the more traditional, doctrinal approach for analyzing international
law.
This Article builds on their insights and evaluates the merits of an
economic approach in the area of international water law. It compares the
economic approach with the traditional doctrinal approach to international law
by analyzing both in the context of the conflict between Ethiopia, Egypt, and
nine other riparian states over the allocation of the Nile’s water resources. The
Article argues that the traditional doctrinal approach, while useful in framing the
legal issues for the parties, is of limited value without an understanding of when,
how, and under what conditions states will comply with or violate international
law. An economics approach, however, moves beyond international law doctrine
and exposes the underlying preferences of states and the obstacles to
international dispute resolution. It also opens the door to think creatively about
mechanisms to incentivize states to cooperate and achieve mutually beneficial
outcomes. Applied to Egypt, Ethiopia, and the Nile, the economics approach
shows that a combination of incentives and the threat of retaliation—not the
substantive international law—shapes state decision-making, and it potentially
1

See, generally, Eric A. Posner & Alan O. Sykes, THE ECONOMIC FOUNDATIONS
INTERNATIONAL LAW (2013).
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offers a useful framework to better understand and resolve international water
law disputes.
Section I of the Article briefly describes the importance of the Nile and
provides background on the conflict among the riparian states, focusing on
Egypt and Ethiopia. Section II describes the substantive international law
governing international watercourses, presents Egypt and Ethiopia’s conflicting
legal positions regarding the exploitation of the Nile’s water resources, and
critiques the traditional doctrinal approach to resolving the conflict. Section III
discusses the economics approach and focuses on how the preferences of the
actors, the prospects of retaliation, and the lack of a central enforcement
mechanism shape state incentives to comply with international law.

II. T H E N I L E , E G Y P T ,

AND

ETHIOPIA

The Nile is the world’s longest river, running some 4250 miles through
north and northeastern Africa, and ending in a delta just south of the
Mediterranean Sea.2 The Nile has two main tributaries: the White Nile, which
begins in and around Lake Victoria and borders Tanzania, Uganda, and Kenya;
and the Blue Nile, which begins in Lake Tana in Ethiopia.3 The White and Blue
Nile flow north and meet around Khartoum, Sudan, creating the Nile, which
eventually flows into Egypt. 4 Given the length of the Nile and its tributaries, the
Nile is an international watercourse5 creating potential water resources—and
opportunities for serious conflict over the division of those resources—for
Egypt and Sudan downstream, South Sudan, Eritrea, Rwanda, Burundi, and the
Democratic Republic of Congo midstream, and Tanzania, Uganda, Kenya, and
Ethiopia upstream.
Unsurprisingly, the Nile is most clearly associated with Egypt. From the
time of Ancient Egypt to the present, the Nile has been prominent in Egyptian
history and culture, and it heavily contributes to Egyptian identity.6 However,
2

See Christina M. Carroll, Past and Future Legal Framework of the Nile River Basin, 12 GEO. INT’L
ENVTL. L. REV. 269, 272–73 (1999).

3

See Jeffrey D. Azarva, Conflict on the Nile: International Watercourse Law and the Elusive Effort to Create a
Transboundary Water Regime in the Nile Basin, 25 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 457, 461 (2011).

4

Id.

5

In simple terms, an international watercourse is a river and its system of tributaries located in
more than one state. Section III describes the international law regulating international
watercourses.

6

See Katrina Manson & Borzou Daragahi, Water: Battle of the Nile, FINANCIAL TIMES (June 19,
2013), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/bc79c9ac-d364-11e2-95d4-00144feab7de.html#axzz2w
Eqd5Wy6 (“Officials in Egypt, which relies on the Nile for power generation, irrigation,
recreation and even its national identity, say repeatedly that Ethiopia may not take ‘a single drop’
of Egypt’s share of the river.”). For an opinion piece on the cultural and identity issues
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focusing on the prominence of the Nile in Egyptian society only serves to mask
the Nile’s role in shaping the day-to-day life prospects of the Egyptian people.
Consider the following data about the Nile’s importance to Egypt. The Nile
provides 96 percent of Egypt’s renewable freshwater and the Nile Valley hosts
98 percent of Egypt’s 85 million people.7 Approximately 95 percent of Egypt’s
population lives within twelve miles of the Nile,8 mainly because Egypt receives
the least rainfall of any state in Africa.9 The Nile also provides nearly 86 percent
of Egypt’s freshwater for agriculture10—a major component of the Egyptian
economy—along with water for industrial production and sewage treatment.
And the Nile’s importance to Egypt is only increasing: over the twentieth
century, the Nile’s water volume has been declining while demands for access to
the Nile’s water resources from upper riparian states have been increasing.11 This
tension only serves to highlight the continued importance of the Nile’s water
resources to Egypt, as it is “not only . . . an economic lifeline but is also
considered a security issue of the highest order.”12
Ethiopia, however, has a very different relationship with the Nile. Though
the Blue Nile starts in the Ethiopian Highlands in Lake Tana, Ethiopia has not
been able to exploit the Blue Nile’s water resources for the myriad economic,
political, and geostrategic reasons discussed in Section IV. Ethiopia, through the
Blue Nile and a minor tributary called the Atbara River, provides over 85
percent of the water that eventually flows into the Nile;13 in other words, it
provides the vast majority of the Nile water volume on which Egypt depends. But, in stark
contrast to Egypt, according to some estimates Ethiopia only uses “[under 1
percent] of the water resources of the Nile basin even though the Nile
constitutes approximately 68% of [Ethiopia’s] available water resources.”14 For
complicating Egypt and Ethiopia’s dispute over the Nile, see Teshome Abebe, Of Egypt, Gratuitous
Contempt, and National Identity, AIGAFORUM (June 12, 2013), http://aigaforum.com/articles/ofegypt.php.
7

See Abadir M. Ibrahim, The Nile Basin Cooperative Framework Agreement: The Beginning of the End of
Egyptian Hydro-Political Hegemony, 18 MO. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 282, 287, n.13 (2011).

8

Kristin Wiebe, The Nile River: Potential for Conflict and Cooperation in the Face of Water Degradation, 41
NAT. RESOURCES J. 731, 732 (2001).

9

See Azarva, supra note 3, at 461–62.

10

See Wiebe, supra note 8, at 734.

11

See Carroll, supra note 2, at 275 (“New pressures are also straining this water resource. Rising
demand for water, due to development and population growth, has led to rising water costs,
diminishing supplies, and water pollution.”).

12

See Ibrahim, supra note 7, at 288.

13

Id. at 285 (“The source of the Blue Nile, which constitutes 86% of the volume of the Nile is
Ethiopia . . . “). See also Carroll, supra note 2, at 275 (“Ethiopia contributes eighty-six percent of
Nile flow, whereas Egypt contributes nothing.”).

14

Ibrahim, supra note 7, at 288.
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Ethiopia, a country plagued by famine and drought with a population of over 96
million people,15 even a small increase in its use of the Blue Nile’s water
resources would have a substantial effect on the life prospects of Ethiopians.
With that in mind, Ethiopia initiated the $4.2 billion Grand Ethiopian
Renaissance Dam Project (“the Dam Project”) in 2011 with the goal of creating
one of the world’s largest hydroelectric power plants.16 Ethiopia has partially
funded the Dam Project to the tune of $1.8 billion and the Dam Project is
approximately 20 percent complete.17 Ethiopia has not, however, secured
funding for the remaining money necessary to complete the Dam Project,
though it has started the process of diverting some of the Blue Nile toward the
Dam Project reservoir.18 Egypt, heavily dependent on the Nile, is extremely
concerned19 that the Dam Project might result in diverting waters from the Blue
Nile that would ordinary flow into the Nile and that the reservoir associated with
the Dam Project would lead to evaporation of some of the Blue Nile’s water
volume. In both instances, Egypt fears a serious reduction in the Nile’s overall
water volume once it reaches Egypt.20
Realizing the potential for conflict regarding the Nile, Egypt, Ethiopia, and
the other riparian states developed the Nile Basin Initiative (the “NBI”) in 1999
as a forum to rethink the allocation of the Nile’s water resources.21 More

15

The World Factbook: Ethiopia, 2013-14, Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, https://
www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/et.html (last updated Apr. 8, 2014).

16

Ethiopia: Egypt Attack Proposals ‘Day Dreaming,’ YA LIBNAN (June 5, 2013), http://www.
yalibnan.com/2013/06/05/ethiopia-egypt-attack-proposals-day-dreaming/.

17

Id.

18

Id. (stating, as of June 5, 2013, that “Ethiopia a week ago started diverting the flow of the Nile
toward the $4.2 billion hydroelectric plant dubbed the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam”).

19

See Dereje Zeleke Mekonnen, The Nile Basin Cooperative Framework Agreement Negotiations and the
Adoption of a ‘Water Security’ Paradigm: Flight into Obscurity or a Logical Cul-de-sac?, 21 EUR. J. INT’L L.
421, 431 (2010) (noting “[t]he near absolute dependence of Egypt on the Nile for its survival” and
the perception among Egyptians “of the Nile waters question as a matter of national security, and
one posing an existential threat to the very survival of Egypt”).

20

Ahmed Feteha & William Davison, Egypt and Ethiopia Disagree on Probe of Nile Dam Impact,
BLOOMBERG NEWS (Nov. 6, 2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-11-06/egypt-andethiopia-disagree-on-probe-of-nile-dam-impact.html (stating that the Dam Project “has raised
concern in Cairo that it will reduce the flow of the Nile, which provides almost all of Egypt’s
water”).

21

About the NBI, NILE BASIN INITIATIVE, http://nilebasin.org/index.php/about-us/nile-basininitiative (last visited Feb. 7, 2014). See also Mekonnen, supra note 19, at 425 (explaining that the
NBI “promised to be a harbinger of a new era manifesting a remarkable shift in the tone and
substance of state-to-state relationships along the Nile”) (internal citations omitted). NBI
members include Egypt, Ethiopia, Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo, Sudan, South Sudan
(as of 2011), Rwanda, Tanzania, Uganda, and Kenya, with Eritrea holding “observer status.” See
Accord or Discord on the Nile?—Part I, INTERNATIONAL WATER LAW PROJECT BLOG (July 26, 2010),
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important, in 2010, the NBI produced a Cooperative Framework Agreement
(the “CFA”)—rejected by Egypt and Sudan—in which six of the upper riparian
states (Ethiopia, Tanzania, Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda, and Burundi) agreed to
utilize more of the Nile’s water resources.22 But Egypt and Sudan’s refusal to
join the CFA, combined with the fact that the CFA does not specify the amount
of water each riparian state is entitled to use,23 leaves Egypt and Ethiopia back
where they started—in conflict over their respective shares of the Nile’s water
resources.
Since then, Ethiopia has moved forward with the Dam Project and Egypt
has become increasingly concerned about the impact on the Nile.24 Though
Ethiopia is still some distance from completing the Dam Project, Egyptian
leaders have started to consider and threaten severe consequences for Ethiopia.
In 2010, Egypt and Sudan plotted to take military action against Ethiopia to
protect their interests in the Nile. That year, WikiLeaks published emails
acquired from Strategic Forecasting, Inc., (STRATFOR) in which a high-level
Egyptian official close to then-President Mubarak wrote that:
The only country that is not cooperating is Ethiopia. We are continuing [ . . . ] the
diplomatic approach. Yes, we are discussing military cooperation with
Sudan. . . . If it comes to a crisis, we will send a jet to bomb the dam
and come back in one day, simple as that. Or we can send our special
forces in to block/sabotage the dam. . . . Look back to an operation Egypt
did in the mid-late 1970s, I think 1976, when Ethiopia was trying to build a large
dam. We blew up the equipment while it was traveling by sea to Ethiopia.25

As recently as June 2013, former President Morsi and his aides, unaware that
their conversation was televised, discussed the possibility of sabotaging the Dam
Project and aiding anti-government rebels in Ethiopia.26 Finally, in early
November 2013, Egypt and Ethiopia again disagreed—in diplomatic language—
on the merits of a report regarding the potential regional impact of the Dam
http://www.internationalwaterlaw.org/blog/2010/07/26/accord-or-discord-on-the-nile%E2%80%93-part-i/.
22

See Walter Menya, Kenya signs Nile Basin pact, DAILY NATION (May 19, 2010), http://www.
nation.co.ke/News/Kenya+signs+Nile+Basin+pact/-/1056/921332/-/t6xaucz/-/index.html.
See Ibrahim, supra note 7, for a general discussion of the NBI and the CFA.

23

See Mekonnen, supra note 19, at 430 (discussing the CFA’s non-legal concept of “water security”
and explaining that the term would practically “mean anything a riparian country wanted it to”).

24

See, for example, Feteha & Davison, supra note 20 (discussing Cairo’s concerns with the Dam
Project).

25

Michael Kelley & Robert Johnson, STRATFOR: Egypt Is Prepared to Bomb All Of Ethiopia’s Nile
Dams, BUSINESS INSIDER (Oct. 13, 2012), http://www.businessinsider.com/hacked-stratforemails-egypt-could-take-military-action-to-protect-its-stake-in-the-nile-2012-10
(emphasis
in
original).

26

See ‘Day Dreaming,’ supra note 16.
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Project.27 While it is clear that Egypt and Ethiopia have significant disagreements
over the Nile, they have been willing to entertain, at least in theory, the
possibility of international cooperation. Since resolution of the conflict over the
Nile implicates existing international law, I turn now to the legal materials
governing the use of international watercourses.

III. T H E L A W

OF INTERNATIONAL

WATERCOURSES

A. The Convention and Customary International Law
Before examining Egypt’s and Ethiopia’s competing legal positions, it is
instructive to turn first to the extant substantive international law rules. The key
rules governing the use of the Nile are largely derived from the Convention on
the Law of Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses28 (“the
Convention”) concluded by the United Nations in 1997. Thirty-four states have
ratified the Convention, including Israel, Germany, France, Nigeria and South
Africa, among others, just short of the required thirty-five states necessary for
the Convention to enter into force.29 Although Egypt and Ethiopia are not
parties to it, the Convention is generally considered to be the most accurate
representation of customary international law regarding international
watercourses.30
The Convention rests on the core principles of equitable and reasonable
utilization and participation of the riparian states exploiting a watercourse, and
an obligation not to cause significant harm to other states sharing the
watercourse. These principles are reflected in Articles 5 and 7 of the
Convention. Article 5 requires states to “participate in the use, development and
protection of an international watercourse in an equitable and reasonable
manner,”31 and instructs them to use and develop the international watercourse
“with a view to attaining optimal and sustainable utilization thereof and benefits

27

See Feteha & Davison, supra note 20.

28

Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses, May 21,
1997, 36 I.L.M. 700 [hereinafter the Convention]. See Aaron Schwabach The United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses, Customary International
Law and the Interests of Developing Upper Riparians, 33 TEX. INT’L L.J. 257, 269 (1998), for a
discussion of the Convention.

29

XXVII.12. Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses, United
Nations Treaty Database, https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=IND&mtdsg_no
=XXVII-12&chapter=27&lang=en (May 21, 1997).

30

See Azarva, supra note 3, at 476 (“The Watercourse Convention is the best articulation of
customary international law today, but it is far from irreproachable.”).

31

The Convention, supra note 28, art. 5(2).
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therefrom.”32 Article 7 imposes an obligation on states to “take all appropriate
measures to prevent the causing of significant harm”33 to the other states sharing
an international watercourse. This principle reflects the maxim sic utere tuo ut
alienum non laedas34 and suggests that upstream riparian states can develop their
water resources, as long as such development does not “significantly harm”
downstream riparian states. Articles 5 and 7 of the Convention, read together,
appear to encourage states to minimize significant harm from their use of the
international watercourse and to reach equitable and reasonable solutions to
watercourse conflicts.

B. Egypt’s Claim under International Law
Egypt would likely offer several justifications under international law to
support its claim that it has a near exclusive right to use the Nile and its
resources. Egypt’s likely claim applies to all of the Nile’s riparian states but, for
purposes of this Article, I will generally focus on its claim as it pertains to
Ethiopia. First, Egypt would argue that a 1902 treaty between Great Britain and
Ethiopia,35 in which Ethiopia purports to disclaim any right to the Nile and
agrees not to take any measures that would reduce the availability of the Nile’s
water resources to Egypt, precludes Ethiopia from building the Dam Project.
Since Egypt was a British Protectorate at the time of the treaty, Egypt essentially
would argue that it is a third-party beneficiary of the treaty.
Moreover, Egypt could rely on Article 7 of the Convention, which imposes
a duty on states to take measures to prevent causing significant harms to other
states sharing an international watercourse, to argue that it has a right to limit
upper riparian development of the Nile’s water resources. The claim would be
that the Dam Project will cause significant harm to Egypt by negatively affecting
the Nile’s water volume and reducing Egypt’s water resources. From Egypt’s
side, the 1902 treaty, in conjunction with the Convention and customary
international law, prohibits Ethiopia from exploiting the Nile.
Egypt also likely subscribes to the appropriation doctrine of allocating
water rights, linked to a theory of prior or historical use. Although there are
different versions of the appropriation doctrine, it basically stands for the
proposition that the first user of some amount of water for a beneficial purpose
32

The Convention, supra note 28, art. 5(1). See Azarva, supra note 3, at 477–78, for a discussion of
the factors relevant to determining equitable and reasonable use outlined in Article 6 of the
Convention.

33

The Convention, supra note 28, art. 7(1).

34

See Azarva, supra note 3, at 482.

35

The Frontiers Between The Soudan, Ethiopia, and Eritrea (May 15, 1902), Eth.-It.-U.K., art. III,
UK Treaties Online, available at http://treaties.fco.gov.uk/docs/pdf/1902/TS0016.pdf.
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has an exclusive property right to the amount of water utilized as against
subsequent users. Such users can only use the remaining amount of water to the
extent that it does not interfere with the right of the first user. In this context,
Egypt would argue that potential subsequent users of the Nile—for our
purposes, Ethiopia—can only use the Nile to the extent that such use doesn’t
interfere with Egypt’s prior use. And, since Egypt claims to use all or nearly all
of the Nile’s water resources, almost any use of the Nile’s water resources by
Ethiopia or any other upper riparian state would interfere with Egypt’s rights as
outlined under this doctrine.
Finally, Egypt has argued that 1929 and 1959 treaties between Egypt and
Sudan purporting to govern the use of the Nile apply to the nine other riparian
states, even though these states were not formal parties to the agreements.36 In
1929, nominally independent Egypt and British protectorate Anglo-Egyptian
Sudan, both under British supervision, jointly agreed to divide the Nile’s water
resources.37 In the 1929 treaty, Egypt “recognized Sudan’s right to utilize an
increased quantity of the Nile waters—an increase in ‘quantity as does not
infringe Egypt’s natural and historical rights in the waters of the Nile and its
requirements of agricultural expansion.’”38 After Sudan’s independence, Egypt
and Sudan revisited the terms of the 1929 treaty in the 1959 Nile Waters
Agreement,39 which modified the allocation of water between the two countries,
excluded the other riparian states, and explicitly “adopt[ed] a united view” on
any attempts by other states to make claims on the Nile’s water resources.40
Though the legal mechanism isn’t completely clear, Egypt has at various times
36

See Valerie Knobelsdorf, The Nile Waters Agreements: Imposition and Impacts of a Transboundary Legal
System, 44 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 622, 623–24 (2006) (“The core Nile Waters Agreements
(signed between Egypt and Britain in 1929, and Egypt and Sudan in 1959) allocate a vast majority
of the Nile’s flow to Egypt, and purport to bind all upstream riparian nations to its allotments and
obligations.”) (internal citations omitted).

37

See Exchange of Notes Between His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom and the
Egyptian Government in Regard to the Use of the Waters of the River Nile for Irrigation
Purposes, May 7, 1929, available at http://ocid.nacse.org/tfdd/tfdddocs/92ENG.pdf.

38

Mekonnen, supra note 19, at 432 (citing Exchange of Notes, supra note 37). See also Wiebe, supra
note 8, at 746 (noting the countries’ conclusion in the 1929 treaty “that construction on the river,
its tributaries, or its source that would possibly obstruct the Nile’s flow and affect Egypt’s own
exploitation of the water would be impermissible”).

39

Agreement for the Full Utilization of the Nile Waters, Sudan-Egypt (Nov. 8, 1959), 453 U.N.T.S.
51, available at http://ocid.nacse.org/tfdd/tfdddocs/230ENG.pdf.

40

Wiebe, supra note 8, at 746. See also Mekonnen, supra note 19, at 435 (explaining that the 1959
treaty’s objective of full control and exclusive utilization of the Nile by Egypt and Sudan has been
rightly described as “patently anomalous,” because of “the fact that while it is purely bilateral, it
seeks to apportion the entire flow of the Nile to Egypt and Sudan, excluding the interests of any
other riparian . . . . It is indeed an utterly iniquitous agreement contingent upon zero water use by
upstream riparians”) (internal citations omitted).
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argued that these treaties serve to guarantee Egypt a right to the Nile, while
precluding any of the upper riparian states from accessing the Nile’s water
resources.41

C. Ethiopia’s Claim under International Law
Unsurprisingly, Ethiopia would likely reject the validity of the 1902 treaty
with Great Britain and argue that Article 5 of the Convention and the Harmon
Doctrine42 support its decision to utilize the Nile’s water resources and develop
the Dam Project. Ethiopia would likely argue that the 1902 treaty is not
controlling because Ethiopia did not formally ratify it and, even if it were ratified
the relevant treaty article concerning the use of the Nile has different and
competing meanings in the English and Amharic language versions of the
treaty.43 At bottom, Ethiopia’s core claim would be that, the 1902 treaty did not
include language disclaiming Ethiopia’s right to exploit the Nile’s water
resources.
Ethiopia would also claim the unconditional and exclusive right to develop
and utilize the Nile’s water resources within its territory.44 Relying on the
Harmon Doctrine—the idea that jurisdiction over natural resources in a
sovereign’s territory is exclusive and absolute—Ethiopia would claim it has the
right to unimpeded exploitation of the Nile’s water resources within its territorial
jurisdiction. Those resources would include all of the Blue Nile and the Atbara
River. The Dam Project is designed to utilize them.

41

See Knobelsdorf, supra note 36, at 627–28:
Aware of its vulnerable position as the furthest downstream nation along the
river, Egypt has continued to govern its use of Nile waters with the strategy of
protecting and enhancing its potential future claims. Since the enactment of
the 1929 Agreements, Egypt has adhered to a nationalist theory of water
rights, according to which all important works on the Nile should be
constructed in Egyptian territory in order to avoid the danger of any works
built outside of the country being used as a political weapon against Egypt.
(internal citations omitted).

42

See Azarva, supra note 3, at 480.

43

For a comprehensive discussion of Ethiopia’s and Great Britain’s claims regarding the validity of
the 1902 treaty and their competing interpretations of Article III, see, generally, Tadesse Kassa
Woldetsadik, INTERNATIONAL WATERCOURSES LAW IN THE NILE RIVER BASIN: THREE STATES AT
A CROSSROADS (2013).

44

“Historically, [Ethiopia] has adhered to the principle of absolute territorial sovereignty, which
provides that a riparian state may engage in the untrammeled use of that part of an international
watercourse within its territory, even to the detriment of downstream parties.” Id. at 480 (internal
citations omitted). See also Knobelsdorf, supra note 36, at 636 (noting that Ethiopia has reserved
“its natural and territorial claims to the river for potential large-scale development in the future”)
(internal citations omitted).
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If that fails, Ethiopia would also likely argue that support for this position
is found in Article 5 of the Convention, which permits riparian states sharing an
international watercourse to utilize the watercourse in an equitable and
reasonable manner. Through Article 5, Ethiopia could argue that the
Convention implicitly rejects an appropriation approach to international
watercourses, one that would have assigned the right to exploit the international
watercourse to the first state to utilize it, in favor of a riparian approach that
permits each riparian state to have equal use of the international watercourse.
Building the Dam Project to exploit water resources within its territory,
according to Ethiopia, would be consistent with the language and spirit of
Article 5. Finally, Ethiopia would surely reject any claim that treaties between
Egypt and Sudan, to which Ethiopia was not a party, govern Ethiopia’s current
and future use of the Nile’s water resources.45

D. The Traditional Doctrinal Approach
A traditional approach would start with all of the relevant legal materials
and engage in a doctrinal analysis of the merits of the Egyptian and Ethiopian
claims regarding the Nile. Such an approach to resolving this conflict might
focus on the Convention; the 1902 treaty between Great Britain and Ethiopia;
the 1929 and 1959 treaties between Egypt and Sudan; the appropriation
doctrine; the Harmon Doctrine; the content of customary international law; and
international water law jurisprudence from relevant courts. For example, such an
approach would examine the language of the 1902 treaty; the legal consequence
of Great Britain and Ethiopia’s non-ratification; the translation of the Ethiopian
and British versions; and the relevance of the Vienna Convention on Succession
of States in Respect of Treaties. It would examine the 1929 treaty between Egypt
and Sudan—drafted and agreed while both states were under British
administration—to see if its terms also governed Tanzania, Uganda, and Kenya
as successor states to colonial Great Britain under the theory of universal
succession. Such an approach would consider claims of rebus sic stansibus—
changed conditions—of the former British colonies and protectorates, and
examine whether the clean slate doctrine (or the Nyerere Doctrine), which holds

45

See Knobelsdorf, supra note 36, at 630:
Even before the enactment of the 1959 Agreement, Ethiopia was also one of
the first upstream nations to express doubts about the binding force of such
bilateral treaties on upper riparians. Beginning in 1956, Ethiopian authorities
made statements that indicated that the nation no longer considered the
previous Nile Waters Agreements as binding on itself or on other independent
basin nations.
(internal citations omitted).
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that successor states do not necessarily inherit the obligations arising out of
treaties made by their predecessors, applies in this context.46
The approach would next determine whether and in what way the
Convention reflects customary international law binding on Ethiopia and Egypt.
It would carefully interpret the relevant legal documents to properly construe the
meaning of terms like “equitable and reasonable manner” and “significant harm”
in Articles 5 and 7 of the Convention. It would look to the litigation surrounding
the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project on the Danube River at the International
Court of Justice.47 Finally, a traditional doctrinal international law approach
would consider whether the appropriation and Harmon doctrines actually reflect
modern thinking about how upstream and downstream states sharing an
international watercourse should use and develop it.
After weighing all of these legal materials, the doctrinal analysis would
presumably produce some legal conclusion: perhaps Egypt has the better legal
argument and should be permitted to limit the utilization of the Nile by
upstream riparian states like Ethiopia, or perhaps Ethiopia can exploit its water
resources to the extent that it does not cause significant harm to downstream
states like Sudan and Egypt. Of course, it could be argued that the doctrinal
analysis would be simplified if the focus were on only one document, like the
Convention. But even if the Convention were the sole binding international legal
document available to resolve the conflict between Egypt and Ethiopia, the
Convention’s two core articles—Articles 5 and 7—leave sufficient ambiguity to
permit both states to view the Convention as supportive of their respective legal
positions. Simply stated, there is no binding principle of international law that
compels a particular result for the parties.48
But this traditional approach, while arriving at a legal conclusion on the
merits of the competing Egyptian and Ethiopian claims, might not get us very
far. In a world without a central enforcement mechanism, it is not clear that
Ethiopia and Egypt would respect the determination of an international court or
international arbitral body on an issue inextricably linked to their core economic
46

The Nyerere Doctrine, named after Tanzania’s first President Julius Nyerere, “holds that
successor states are not bound by the treaty obligations of the predecessors, with a controversial
carve-out exception for territorial, real, dispositive, or localized treaties. Azarva, supra note 3, at
471 (internal quotations omitted).

47

See Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 7 (Sept. 25), available at http://
www.worldcourts.com/icj/eng/decisions/1997.09.25_gabchkovo.htm.
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Azarva, supra note 3, at 492–93:
Herein lies the larger problem with ambiguity in legal formulae: it is a doubleedged sword. The same ambiguity that can help grease the wheels of
negotiation can also serve to reinforce parties’ divergent bargaining positions,
increasing the chance of conflict when one side’s performance fails to comport
with the other party’s understanding of that side’s legal obligations.
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and national security interests. And, if we lack a framework for thinking about
state preferences and the motivations of states for complying with or ignoring
international law, then we won’t be able to determine the conditions under
which international law will be respected or enforced. Put more concretely, why
would Ethiopia and Egypt respect international law on the determination of
their rights regarding the utilization and development of the Nile’s water
resources?

IV. A N E C O N O M I C S A P P R O A C H T O T H E L A W
INTERNATIONAL WATERCOURSES

OF

A. Economics and International Law
Posner and Sykes provide an economic framework that helps us better
understand the nature of the conflict between Ethiopia and Egypt and the legal
and non-legal obstacles to achieving an outcome that is satisfactory to both
sides. Beginning with a simple set of assumptions,49 we can start to see the
challenges that a more traditional doctrinal approach to international law faces
when attempting to resolve disputes. Let us begin by assuming that Ethiopia and
Egypt are rational states pursuing their respective interests in a world without a
central enforcement mechanism. Both Ethiopia and Egypt understand that there
isn’t a world government or global policeman to enforce international law—
perhaps creating opportunities to ignore international legal rules—but they also
recognize that failure to comply with international law might result in retaliation,
reputational costs, or international sanctions from other states. Though both
states have different preferences, each wants to benefit from international
cooperation while ideally reducing international externalities.
Here, we know that Ethiopia and Egypt have competing preferences
regarding the use of the Nile and different interpretations of the relevant
international law governing international watercourses. Since Egypt views itself
as the first user of the Nile and has exploited the Nile’s water resources more
than any other riparian state, Egypt has a paramount interest in preserving the
status quo.50 Put bluntly, the Nile is essential to Egypt’s existence. Ethiopia, on
the other hand, provides over 85 percent of the Nile’s volume but utilizes less

49

For illustrative reasons and space considerations, the economics approach discussed here is
necessarily simplified.

50

See Mekonnen, supra note 19, at 438 (noting “the entrenched positions of Sudan and Egypt which
are determined to perpetuate the status quo and reject any ‘modification of their shares of the river
per the 1929 and 1959 treaties’”) (emphasis in original) (citing Ethiopia says all Nile states agreed on
NBI, but not Sudan and Egypt, SUDAN TRIBUNE (Aug. 7, 2009), http://sudantribune.com/
spip.php?article32053).
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than 1 percent of the Blue Nile’s water resources.51 If Ethiopia succeeds in its
claim to the Blue Nile, Ethiopia stands to gain enormously from exercising its
exclusive and absolute right to exploit natural resources within its territory. Since
the Blue Nile is underutilized and represents some 68 percent of Ethiopia’s
water supply, the Dam Project could use the water to improve dramatically
Ethiopia’s agricultural conditions and its potential to generate hydroelectric
power. This appears to create a puzzle: if the benefits of the Dam Project are
clear, Ethiopia has confidence in its legal position, and we live in a world
without a central enforcement mechanism, why doesn’t Ethiopia simply build
the dam and ignore Egypt’s claims? After all, Ethiopia is not only the source of
the vast majority of the Nile’s water volume but also an upstream riparian state;
it is in an ideal position to exploit the Nile.
A key part of the economics framework helps to answer this question.
Beneficial international cooperation and the reduction of international
externalities will only happen if there are costs for violating international law. In
other words, a state trying to decide whether to violate international law must
consider the potential for other states to respond or retaliate. It must consider
the costs of defection. Under certain conditions, the prospect of retaliation from
other states (and the costs that they could impose) might disincentivize a state
from violating international law. Although this is a simplification, we can
imagine the retaliation coming in two forms. First, retaliation might take place
within an international institution. For example, states might not support the
initiatives of the violator state or might refuse to work with that state in
multilateral settings. Second, the retaliation might occur in the realm of politics,
rather than through international law or international institutions. A group of
states or even a single state might take diplomatic steps to signal disapproval,
initiate unilateral or multilateral sanctions against the violator state, or even
threaten war. The threat of retaliation, under certain conditions, frames the
incentives of states and encourages states to comply with international law.
How does the prospect of retaliation shape Ethiopia’s decision to build
and continue the development of the Dam Project? At first glance, one might
think that Ethiopia, as the upper riparian state without a common border with
Egypt, is well placed to ignore Egypt’s claims to all of the Nile’s water resources.
Ethiopia has the support of the other riparian states and the Dam Project is
squarely within Ethiopia’s borders. But a closer evaluation demonstrates that the
threat of retaliation from Egypt is a serious deterrent to Ethiopia’s project.
As a preliminary issue, it is only recently that Ethiopia has had the
necessary governmental stability and economic resources to even consider

51

See Ibrahim, supra note 7, at 286–88.
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building a dam on the Nile.52 Since World War II, Ethiopia has had a monarchy
under Haile Selassie (until 1975); a Communist government under Mengistu
Hailemariam (until 1991); a dictatorship under the late Meles Zenawi (until
2012); and a new dictatorship under Hailemariam Desalegn (2012 to the
present).53 During most of this time, Ethiopia unsuccessfully attempted to quell
a secessionist movement in what is now Eritrea, culminating in Eritrean
independence in 1993, and resulting in a subsequent war between Ethiopia and
Eritrea in the late 1990s and early 2000s.54 This governmental instability,
combined with massive drought in the mid-to-late 1980s, made a serious project
to dam the Nile economically and politically infeasible.
However, Ethiopia’s clear inability to commence a dam project in the past
did not stop Egypt from announcing its intention to retaliate in response to any
attempts by Ethiopia to dam the Nile. As early as 1979, Egyptian President
Anwar Sadat declared that “[t]he only matter that could take Egypt to war again
is water.”55 As noted above, Egyptian Presidents Mubarak and Morsi also
characterized any potential dam as a vital threat to Egyptian national security,
and, given the vast US economic and military support that Egypt has received
over the years, Egypt has the military capacity and the political will to make true
on its threats.56 Even beyond the potential for retaliation, Egypt’s geopolitical
importance to the US has made it possible for Egypt to block Ethiopian
initiatives to secure World Bank and private funding for a dam. Put concretely, it
has been Egypt’s economic strength, military resources, and geopolitical
52

See Knobelsdorf, supra note 36, at 629 (“Ethiopia in particular has expressed its dissatisfaction
with the Egypt-Sudan water agreements, but has generally lacked the ability to actively reserve any
significant portions of the Nile water for domestic irrigation purposes.”) (internal citations
omitted).
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See The World Factbook: Ethiopia, supra note 15 (“In 1974, a military junta, the Derg, deposed
emperor Haile Selassie (who had ruled since 1930) and established a socialist state. Torn by
bloody coups, uprisings, wide-scale drought, and massive refugee problems, the regime was finally
toppled in 1991 by a coalition of rebel forces.”).
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For a general discussion on the relationship between Ethiopia and Eritrea, see Ethiopia/Eritrea,
INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP, http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/horn-of-africa/
ethiopia-eritrea.aspx.
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See Azarva, supra note 3, at 457. See also Jutta Brunnée & Stephen J. Toope, The Changing Nile Basin
Regime: Does Law Matter?, 43 HARV. INT’L L.J. 105, 105–6 (2002):
In the 1970s, Egyptian President Sadat and Ethiopian leader Mengistu Haile
Miriam exchanged threats over the apportionment of the Nile waters.
President Sadat warned that “[t]ampering with the rights of a nation to water is
tampering with its life; and a decision to go to war on this score is indisputable
in the international community.”
(internal citations omitted).
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See Azarva, supra note 3, at 494–97 (outlining the various Egyptian threats to “bomb Ethiopia” to
ensure access to the Nile).
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importance to the US and other major powers, combined with its perceived
willingness to retaliate in defense of its interest in the Nile, that have sufficiently
deterred Ethiopia from aggressively moving to dam the Nile, not the merits of
Egypt’s legal position under international law.57
Viewing the conflict between Ethiopia and Egypt over the Nile through an
economics framework sheds light on state preferences and incentives, and
provides a basis for determining the conditions under which states might comply
with international law. Here, we see that a traditional doctrinal approach to
international law is quite useful for understanding the substantive legal rules
regarding the regulation of international watercourses, but it has little to say
about the conditions under which Egypt and Ethiopia will comply with, violate,
or ignore international law. In fact, if we value the benefits of international
cooperation, the reduction of international externalities, and respect for
international law, we should also focus on the obstacles, challenges, and
limitations facing international law in a world without a central enforcement
mechanism. An economics approach gets us closer to understanding the
conditions under which international law is likely to work, while also
encouraging creative solutions for those international disputes for which law is
unlikely to resolve the issue definitively.

B. The Nile and Transaction Costs Economics
Neither the traditional approach nor the economics framework precludes
the possibility of Egypt and Ethiopia negotiating a treaty to allocate the Nile’s
water resources in a mutually agreeable manner. In fact, negotiations among
Egypt, Ethiopia, and the other states sharing the watercourse have commenced
under the auspices of the NBI and continue, albeit unsuccessfully, under the
CFA Despite the fact that Egypt and Ethiopia—and the nine other riparian
states—negotiate using the language of international law, the NBI will face many
of the same problems that the economics framework has already exposed,
namely, that the preferences and incentives of the central players in the
negotiations, Egypt and Ethiopia, are seemingly intractable. We return to where
we started; international law doctrine sets the substantive rules, while rational,
self-interested states pursue their preferences in a world without a central
enforcement mechanism. So where do we go from here?
Over time, one way or another, the dispute between Egypt and Ethiopia
will be resolved. Ethiopia might complete the Dam Project and utilize the Blue
Nile’s water resources in a manner that causes significant harm, or Egypt might
57

Egypt Should Welcome Ethiopia’s Nile Dam, BLOOMBERG NEWS (June 23, 2013), http://www.bloom
bergview.com/articles/2013-06-23/egypt-should-welcome-not-threaten-ethiopia-s-nile-dam.
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preserve the status quo by destroying the Dam Project and continue to exploit
the vast majority of the Nile’s water resources. Neither option is attractive as
both reflect unilateral actions that will likely produce a suboptimal allocation of
the Nile’s water resources. But an economics approach might help us conceive
of a better outcome than one dictated by power and or another dictated by
traditional doctrinal analysis. As a very tentative thought experiment, perhaps it
is worth considering the merits of a transaction costs approach to the problem.
Building on Coase’s seminal work,58 we might start with the assumption
that if transaction costs are low, the entitlement will flow to the party that values
it most regardless of where the entitlement is initially assigned. How would this
play out here? For a moment we would put aside the international law doctrine
and assign the right to either Egypt or Ethiopia. That is, if the property right
were assigned to Egypt, for example, and Ethiopia valued it more, Ethiopia
would pay Egypt for the property right to build the Dam Project and exploit the
Nile’s water resources. We would arrive at the efficient outcome because the
party that valued the property right the most would secure it. Of course, this
outcome depends on the absence or near absence of transaction costs and, as
discussed above, the transaction costs—the political and monetary costs to
reaching an agreement—between Egypt and Ethiopia appear enormous. In fact,
since the Coasean approach implicitly assumes the existence of the state as an
enforcement mechanism for rights and, in the international law context, there is
no world government, the utility of this approach is not clear.
If transaction costs are high, we might think of a liability rule: Egypt has
the entitlement, and Ethiopia can build the Dam Project and pay Egypt. If
Ethiopia values the Nile’s water resources at $20 billion and Egypt values them
at $10 billion, Ethiopia would build the dam and pay Egypt some amount
between $10 billion and $20 billion—say, $15 billion. But a liability rule assumes
that valuation is easy, and there is no reason to believe that Egypt and Ethiopia
can come to an agreement on the proper valuation of the Nile’s water resources,
especially in the absence of a central enforcement mechanism capable of valuing
the Nile and enforcing the valuation decision.
In light of the valuation issues connected to a liability rule, perhaps the
only option is a property rule. We might assign the property right to Egypt,
leaving Ethiopia to decide whether to infringe Egypt’s right and continue the
58

See Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. & Econ. 1 (1960). Though the literature in
this area is enormous, for a short introduction see RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF
LAW (2007); Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972); Louis Kaplow & Steven
Shavell, Property Rules Versus Liability Rules: An Economic Analysis, 109 HARV. L. REV. 713 (1996);
Saul Levmore, Unifying Remedies: Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Startling Rules, 106 YALE L.J. 2149
(1997).
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Dam Project. Egypt would then have two options: it could destroy the Dam
Project and preserve its exclusive property right in the Nile’s water resources
(retaliation) or it could pay Ethiopia not to continue the Dam Project (bribe).
But, once Ethiopia receives the money, what stops Ethiopia from returning to
Egypt in five years with a new threat to expand the Dam Project on the Blue
Nile? Or, on the other hand, what if Ethiopia ceases the Dam Project in reliance
on an Egyptian promise to pay, and Egypt subsequently reneges? Alternatively,
we could assign Ethiopia the property right, but the same problems exist. To
complicate the matter further, since Ethiopia is the upstream riparian state, it
could completely dam the Blue Nile whether or not it has a property right. And,
if Ethiopia were stronger than Egypt, it wouldn’t matter what Egypt tried to do;
in a world without a central enforcement mechanism, Ethiopia would utilize the
Blue Nile’s water resources, leaving Egypt without recourse.
The status quo is one in which Egypt, in effect, has the property right and
is currently exploiting the Nile, while Ethiopia tentatively attempts to utilize the
water resources of the Blue Nile through the Dam Project, without offering to
pay Egypt for the harm. But what if the status quo were different? Let us assume
that neither Egypt nor Ethiopia is exploiting the Nile. How do ex post property
or liability rules affect the states’ ex ante incentives?59 If Egypt had a property
right and could enjoin or stop Ethiopia from exploiting the Nile, Ethiopia would
underinvest in the Dam Project because it might have to share some portion of
the investment return (the value produced by the Dam Project) with Egypt. The
result is inefficient because Egypt’s property right leads to suboptimal
exploitation of the Nile by Ethiopia.
Now consider a liability rule. If Egypt has the entitlement to the Nile
protected by the liability rule, how does it affect Ethiopia’s ex ante incentives?
With a liability rule, Ethiopia would have to pay Egypt for harms coming from
its Dam Project but could keep any excess investment return. Since Ethiopia
59

For the seminal article on property and liability rules, see Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 58, at
1092 (explaining that “[a]n entitlement is protected by a property rule to the extent that someone
who wishes to remove the entitlement from its holder must buy it from him in a voluntary
transaction in which the value of the entitlement is agreed upon by the seller,” and that
“[w]henever someone may destroy the initial entitlement if he is willing to pay an objectively
determined value for it, an entitlement is protected by a liability rule”). For a consideration of how
property rights have evolved as a result of changing resource demands and new technologies, see
Terry L. Anderson, Donning Coase-Coloured Glasses: A Property Rights View of National Resource
Economics, 48 AUSTL. J. AGRI. & RESOURCE ECON. 445, 447 (2004), which asks whether:
property rights evolve from existing property rights through contracting with
those rights holders to reallocate rights and establish new ones or . . . change
through revolutionary processes that cancel existing rights and redistribute
them to new individuals or groups in an effort to meet the new demands and
new technologies.
(internal citations omitted).
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could capture the investment return over the harm, it would have an incentive to
exploit the Nile at an efficient or optimal level. Ethiopia would exploit the Nile
and pay Egypt the cost of the harm imposed, leaving both parties better off.
Although this extremely simplified example60 only touches on the potential
effect of rules on ex ante incentives, it shows the utility of the economics
approach in thinking about Egypt and Ethiopia’s incentives in their conflict over
the Nile.

V. C O N C L U S I O N
The conflict between Egypt and Ethiopia is not a new one, and we are
likely to see similar conflicts as water scarcity becomes increasing prevalent. The
economics approach applied here helps illuminate the underlying preferences
motivating state behavior and creates space to begin imagining an incentive
structure that would permit states to resolve issues cooperatively and would
reduce externalities. This approach doesn’t reject international law as a body of
substantive rules; rather, it begins to specify the conditions under which
international law can play a meaningful role in fostering international dispute
resolution. In the case of Egypt and Ethiopia, while the economics approach did
not provide a definitive answer to resolve the specific dispute—that is beyond
the scope of a general framework—it does explain why debate over international
water law doctrine is unlikely to end with a determinative interpretation of the
relevant treaties, conventions, and customary international law governing the
issue. The case of Ethiopia and Egypt will be resolved, if at all, with a deeper
understanding of the role of state preferences, the possibility of retaliation, and
the incentives of states in the absence of a world government—the economics
approach.

60

The discussion of Egypt and Ethiopia’s ex ante incentives borrows heavily from Lucian
Bebchuk’s analysis of property and liability rules in the context of the “Factory” and the “Resort.”
See Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Property Rights and Liability Rules: The Ex Ante View of the Cathedral, 100
MICH. L. REV. 601 (2001).
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